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VOTING  BEHAVIOR  AND  INFORMATION  AGGREGATION 
IN  ELECTIONS  WITH  PRIVATE  INFORMATION 
BY  TIMOTHY  FEDDERSEN  AND  WOLFGANG  PESENDORFER' 
We analyze  two-candidate  elections  in which  voters  are uncertain  about  the realization 
of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters. Each voter has noisy private 
information  about the state variable.  We show that the fraction of voters whose vote 
depends  on their private  information  goes to zero as the size of the electorate  goes to 
infinity.  Nevertheless,  elections fully aggregate  information  in the sense that the chosen 
candidate  would  not change  if all private  information  were common  knowledge.  Equilib- 
rium voting behavior  is to a large extent determined  by the electoral rule, i.e., if a 
candidate  is required  to get at least x percent  of the vote in order to win the election, 
then in equilibrium  this candidate  gets very  close to x percent  of the vote with  probability 
close to one. Finally,  if the distribution  from which preferences  are drawn  is uncertain, 
then elections  will generally  not satisfy  full information  equivalence  and the fraction  of 
voters  who take informative  action  does not converge  to zero. 
KEYWORDS:  Voting, elections,  information aggregation. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
A  STRONG ARGUMENT FOR  ELECTIONS is that society may be  collectively better 
informed about the relative quality of a set of alternatives than any individual. 
Elections  provide a mechanism for aggregating private information, ensuring a 
better collective  decision. This idea inspired some of the earliest mathematical 
models of voting in elections  and dates back at least to Condorcet.2 The set of 
environments  in which  elections  might usefully  aggregate  private information 
about  the  relative  quality of  a pair of  alternatives goes  well  beyond  the  jury 
setting that was the  focus  of  Condorcet's work. In most  elections  voters  have 
common values with respect to  some  characteristic of the  alternatives and are 
privately informed about this characteristic. Consider the following examples: 
(i) An election is held to decide whether or not to increase funding for a local 
public  good.  Voters  have  different  valuations  for  the  public  good  and  are 
uncertain  about  the  cost  or the  quality of  the  proposed  plan. One  particular 
example  is  referenda  on  school  funding.  While  voters'  willingness  to  spend 
money on  schools  differs, all agree that better  student performance is prefer- 
able. There is uncertainty about the degree to which increased spending trans- 
lates into student performance. 
(ii)  Voters  must  decide  between  an  incumbent  and  a  challenger.  Voters' 
preferences  have both a private and a common value component.  The private 
1 We  wish  to  thank  Eddie  Dekel,  Drew  Fudenberg,  Okan  Yilankaya,  the  editor  and  three 
anonymous referees  for helpful comments. Pesendorfer gratefully acknowledges support from NSF 
Grant SBR-9409180. 
2 For a discussion of Condorcet's Jury Theorem and extensions see  Ladha (1992), Miller (1986), 
and Young (1988). 
1029 1030  T.  FEDDERSEN  AND  W.  PESENDORFER. 
value component  is voter preferences  over the candidates'  ideological  positions. 
A common  value component  is the "character"  of the candidates.  Candidates 
with good character  can be  relied upon to stick closely to their announced 
positions  while those with poor character  cannot.  Risk averse  voters all prefer  a 
candidate  with better character.  Voters are differentially  informed about the 
record  of each candidate  and therefore  possess private  information.3 
(iii) Voters in Presidential  primaries  are concerned  not only about the policy 
positions  of the competing  candidates  but also about each competitor's  probabil- 
ity of winning the general election. All the primary  voters prefer any of the 
candidates  running  in the primary  to any of the candidates  from the other party. 
Voters possess private  information  about the candidates'  electability.4 
The traditional approach  to the question of how well elections aggregate 
information assumes that  voters  have  identical preferences and  behave 
"naively,"5  i.e.,  each voter behaves as  if  her choice alone determines the 
outcome. However,  naive voting is not generally  an equilibrium  of the corre- 
sponding  voting game.6 Voters face a decision problem that is similar to the 
problem facing bidders in a  common value auction. In both elections and 
auctions an agent's action affects her payoff only in very particular  circum- 
stances. As is well known,  bidders in a common  value auction must condition 
their belief about the value of the object on the event that their bid is the 
highest. Similarly,  voters must condition their beliefs about the quality  of the 
alternatives  on the event that one vote can change the election outcome,  i.e., a 
vote is pivotal.  The following  example  illustrates  the problem. 
A community  must vote on a proposal  to increase school funding.  There are 
two equally  likely states of the world:  the proposal  works  (w) (e.g., it improves 
test scores, reduces dropout rates, etc.) or it does not (nw).  Everyone  in the 
community  favors  the proposal  in state w and is opposed  otherwise.  None of the 
voters knows the state of the world but each voter gets one of two signals:  in 
state w every  voter gets the signal w with probability  0.6. In state nw every  voter 
gets the signal nw with probability  0.6. The proposal  passes if at least 2/3  vote 
in favor.  Suppose  all voters vote "naively,"  i.e., in favor  if they receive signal w 
3In  the literature on macroeconomic  performance  and elections, competence is frequently 
introduced  as a common  value component  of voter preferences.  See, for example,  Alesina, Lon- 
dregan,  and Rosenthal  (1993),  Persson  and Tabellini  (1990),  Rogoff  (1990). 
4 The fact that voters'  decisions  about which candidate  to support  are influenced  by how they 
believe others assess the candidates  is known  as the "bandwagon  effect":  candidates  who are seen 
winning early primaries  gain support in later primaries  (see, for example,  Bartels (1988)). The 
bandwagon  effect is often thought  to be a feature of preferences:  voters like to support  winning 
candidates  just as sports  fans enjoy  rooting  for  winning  teams.  In contrast,  we are suggesting  that the 
phenomenon  is due to voters learning  about  the relative  merits  of the candidates.  The bandwagon 
effect is prima  facie evidence  that electoral  results  reveal  useful information  to voters. 
5See  Ladha (1992), Miller (1986), and Young (1988). See Austen-Smith  and Banks (1996), 
Myerson  (1994b),  and Klevorick  et al. (1984)  for exceptions  to the assumption  of naive  voting. 
6Austen-Smith  and Banks  (1996)  and Feddersen  and Pesendorfer  (1995). ELECTIONS WITH  PRIVATE  INFORMATION  1031 
and opposed otherwise. Then in a large election, whenever a vote is pivotal (i.e., 
2/3  of the voters have voted for the proposal), the state is almost certainly w 
and everyone should vote in favor!7 
As  in  the  above  example, we  consider  a population  of  voters  that  uses  an 
election to choose one of two alternatives (labeled  Q and A). In contrast to the 
above  example,  we  allow  voters  to  have  different  preferences  over  the  two 
alternatives. Each voter's payoff depends on her preference  type, on a state of 
nature, and on  the  winning alternative. Preference  types are  drawn indepen- 
dently from a given distribution whereas the state of nature is common for all 
voters.  Voters  know their  own preference  types but  are  uncertain  about  the 
state of nature. Every voter receives a signal that provides information about the 
realization of the  state of nature. Voting is costless  and voters can either vote 
for  Q or for A.  Alternative  Q wins if the fraction of voters voting for it is at 
least q. We analyze the voting equilibria  of this game (symmetric Nash equilibria 
in which voters do not use weakly dominated strategies). 
In  a voting  equilibrium preference  types can be  divided into  three  groups: 
those types who always vote for Q, those who always vote for A,  and those who 
change their vote depending on their private signal. We say the latter types take 
informative  action. 
Our first three results analyze voting behavior and information aggregation in 
relatively simple environments in which voters are uncertain about a one-dimen- 
sional state variable. 
Theorem  1 demonstrates the inherent tension between  information aggrega- 
tion  and  informative  voting.  We  show  that  the  fraction  of  voters  who  take 
informative action goes to zero as the size of the electorate goes to infinity. The 
result that  almost  no  voters  take  informative  action  in  large  elections  would 
seem  to  put into  grave doubt the  supposed utility of  elections  as information 
aggregation devices. Our next two results show that this is not the case. 
Theorem  2  shows  that  for  a wide  variety of  preference  distributions large 
elections  are almost always very close.  Theorem  3 shows that elections  satisfy 
full information  equivalence:  with probability arbitrarily  close to one, the alterna- 
tive that would have been  chosen  if all the  private information were  common 
knowledge is selected.  This result may appear paradoxical in light of  our first 
result. While the fraction of the electorate's signals revealed in equilibrium goes 
to zero, the  number of voters who reveal their signal goes to infinity so that in 
the limit all information is revealed. Theorem 2 guarantees that the election will 
be  decided by those  taking informative action, and thus, large elections  effec- 
tively aggregate private information. 
7 It should be clear that this example does not depend on the fact that we chose a 2/3  rule rather 
than simple majority rule. It could easily be modified to show that naive voting is generally not a best 
response to a population voting naively also in the case of simple majority rule. 1032  T.  FEDDERSEN  AND  W.  PESENDORFER 
We use  a series of  examples to  illustrate the effect of  relaxing our key 
assumptions.  We also illustrate  in Section  5.1 that, in contrast  to strategic  voting, 
naive voting typically  fails to lead to full information  equivalence. 
Our last result examines the implications  of more complicated  information 
environments.  We demonstrate  that if there is additional  uncertainty  about the 
distribution  of preferences,  then elections  will generally  not satisfy  full informa- 
tion equivalence  and the fraction  of voters  who take informative  action does not 
converge to  zero. The degree to which the  election fails to  meet the full 
information  equivalence requirement  is parameterized  by the level of uncer- 
tainty  about the distribution  of preferences.  When this uncertainty  is small,  the 
election mechanism  almost satisfies  full information  equivalence. 
Our approach  is related in some respects  to the approach  taken  by Lohmann 
(1993) and Austen-Smith  (1990). Lohmann  uses a similar  framework  to analyze 
the effects of private information  on costly participation  in political protest 
movements  while Austen-Smith  examines  the incentives  for strategic  voting in 
small two-alternative  elections. Neither Lohmann  nor Austen-Smith  considered 
the asymptotic  properties  of their models. Our results are also related to the 
literature on  information aggregation in  auctions: Milgrom (1979), Wilson 
(1977), and Pesendorfer  and Swinkels  (1995). In another related paper Palfrey 
(1985) analyzes  information  aggregation  in a Cournot  model. 
2.  THE  MODEL 
We analyze  a two alternative  election. Alternatives  are denoted  by j  E {Q,  A}. 
There are n + 1 voters indexed  by i E {1,...,  n + 11.  A voter's  utility  depends  on 
a preference  parameter  x E [-1,  1] = X, the chosen alternative  j, and the state 
s E [0,  1]. We denote by u(j, s, x) the utility  function  of voters. Let 
(1)  v(s,  x)  u(A,  s, x)  -  u(Q, s, x) 
denote the utility difference of  a voter type x  between alternative A  and 
alternative  Q in state s. 
Each voter knows  her preference  type but is uncertain  about the realization 
of the state. By G(s) we denote the probability  distribution  that describes  the 
prior  beliefs about the state s. Each voter receives a signal 0r  EC  {1,  . ..  , M} -  X 
from an information  service  k E {1,..., K}. We assume  that conditional  on state 
s being realized,  the signal  that voter i receives  is independent  of the signal  that 
voter j receives. Thus we can define the function Pk(U  Is)  which denotes the 
probability  that a voter receives  signal o- if s E [0,1] is realized  and the voter is 
served  by information  service k. 
A voter's  type is characterized  by a preference  parameter  and an information 
service. Let T  [-1,1]  x {i, ...,  K} denote the type space. Let F  be a probabil- 
ity distribution  over T, where F(x, k) denotes the probability  that the type is in 
the set [-1,  x] x k. Let Fx(x)  =  EK 1  F(x, k). The assumption  of K  informa- 
tion services allows us to introduce  correlation  between access to information 
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Nature  selects  the  electorate  by choosing  n + 1 voter  types  independently 
according to the probability distribution F. Each voter knows her own type but 
is  uncertain  about  the  other  voters'  types.  The  distribution  F  is  common 
knowledge. 
A voter can choose  Q or A. Let 0 < q <  1 be a fixed parameter. If the number 
of  voters  who  choose  Q  is  larger than  or  equal  to  (n +  1)  q,  then  Q  is  the 
outcome.  Otherwise, A  is the outcome. 
We make the following assumptions: 
ASSUMPTION  1:  v(x, s)  is continuous and increasing with Iv(x, s) -  v(x, s')I > 
KI s-s'l  and  Iv(x,s)-v(x',s)I2KIx-x'l  for some  K>0.  Moreover, v(-1,s) 
<0,  v(1,s)>0  for alls. 
ASSUMPTION 2:  G has a density  g and there  is an a > 0 such that 1/a  > g(s)  > a 
for all s e  [0, 1]. 
ASSUMPTION 3:  F(x,  k) is continuously  differentiable  in x and f(x,  k) denotes the 
derivative. There  is an  a > 0 such that Ek=  1 f(x,  k) > a for all x E X. 
ASSUMPTION  4 (Monotone  Likelihood  Ratio  Property): If  cu  > u'  and s > s', 
then  Pk('  I s')Pk(o(  I  s)  >Pk(o  I S')Pk('  I  S)  for all k. 
ASSUMPTION 5 (Limited Information):  There  is an a > 0 such that  Pk(  I  s) > a 
for all (k, s). 
ASSUMPTION 6:  nq is an integer. 
Assumption  1  says  that  the  utility  difference  between  alternative  A  and 
alternative  Q  is  continuous  and  strictly increasing  in  x  and  s.  Furthermore, 
voters  with  preference  parameters  at  the  boundary of  X  prefer  one  of  two 
alternatives irrespective of the state s. 
Assumption 2 ensures that every state is in the support of the prior and the 
relative likelihood of any pair of states  g(s)/g(s')  is bounded above and below. 
Assumption 3 implies that every preference  type is in the support of Fx. 
Assumption  4  says  that  the  signal  satisfies  the  monotone  likelihood  ratio 
property (MLRP). One implication is that for s'  >  s, Pk(.  I  S')  first order stochas- 
tically dominates  Pk(-  I  S)  (Witt (1980)).8 In addition, a higher signal indicates to 
the voter that a higher state should be expected for any prior. More precisely, 
for a'  > o- the distribution over states conditional on  cr' first order stochasti- 
cally  dominates  the  probability  distribution  over  states  conditional  on  o- 
(Milgrom (1981)). 
8Note  that since  Pk(' I  S') first order stochastically dominates  Pk(  I  S) for s' > s,  it follows  that 
pk(1 I  S) is nonincreasing in s and pk(M  I  s) is nondecreasing in s. 1034  T.  FEDDERSEN  AND  W.  PESENDORFER 
Assumption  5 says that a voter cannot exclude any state if she receives a 
particular  signal.  Assumption  6 is purely  for notational  convenience.9 
3. STRATEGIES AND  EQUILIBRIUM 
A pure strategy  for voter i, 7ij, is a measurable  function  from  her type and her 
signal to a vote choice, i.e., 7i :  T X  -  -*  {Q,  Al  and a mixed strategy,  7-i, is a 
measurable  function from a voter's type and her signal to the probability  of 
voting for candidate  Q, i.e., vi:  T x X  -*  [0,1]. 
We define a voting  equilibrium 
- 
*  to be a symmetric  Nash equilibrium  in 
which no voter uses a weakly  dominated  strategy. 
The only time a voter can influence  the outcome  of the election is if a vote is 
pivotal,  i.e., exactly  qn of the other n voters  voted for Q. A voter will choose Q 
if, conditional  on a vote being pivotal,  the expected payoff of alternative  Q is 
larger  than the expected  payoff  of alternative  A. 
Given a symmetric  strategy  profile i-  we can compute  the probability  that a 
vote is pivotal  as a function  of the state s. Let 
K  M 
(2)  t(sv 7T)  =  E  E,  pk('J-  I  s)|  1(x,  k, cr  )f(x,  k) dx 
k=1  1  X 
denote the probability  that a randomly  selected voter votes for Q in state s. Let 
piv denote the event that a vote is pivotal.  The probability  that a vote is pivotal 
in state s is given by 
(3)  Pr( piv Is7T)=(qn  )  7,T )  1-(,  r)) 
When 1 > t(s, -7) > 0 for all s, then Pr(piv I  s, ii) > 0 for all s, and therefore,  the 
probability  distribution  over states conditional  on being pivotal  is given by 
(4)  f3(s Ipiv, Tr)  =  Pr(piv  I s, r)g(s) 
fol  Pr(piv I  w, -r) g (w) dw~ 
Similarly,  the probability  distribution  over states conditional  on being pivotal 
and observing  signal cr from service k is given by 
(5)  8(s  Ipiv,  T,  a,  k)  = 
PrpivIS 
I(sTIpi  )pS(  I  s). 
Jf Pr(piv I  w, 77)pk(cr  I)dg(w)  dw 
18(S  IPiV,  I  )PJ(S  I S) 
fOl 1  (W piv  PX  IT)Pk  (:J  I  W) dw 
Let  E(v(x,  s) Ipiv,  x, a, k)  denote  the  expectation  of  v(x, s)  with  respect  to 
,8(t lpiv,  T,  ,, k).  Since  the  signal  satisfies  the  MLRP,  83C  Ipiv,Fr,  u,  k)  first 
9 The only change in the  analysis when  nq is not  an integer is that the  expression  nq must be 
replaced with "largest integer that is smaller or equal to nq." ELECTIONS WITH  PRIVATE  INFORMATION  1035 
order  stochastically  dominates  38( ipiv,r,  o-C',  k)  for  o-->o-'  (see  Milgrom 
(1981)), and hence  E(v(x,  s) Ipiv, -T, o-, k) is nondecreasing in  o-. 
A  strategy is characterized by cutpoints if for every information service and 
every signal there is a cutpoint xk  such that the voter chooses  Q whenever the 
preference  type is smaller than  xk  and  A  otherwise. If the  cutpoints  xk  are 
nonincreasing  in  o-, then  we  say  that  the  strategy  can  be  characterized  by 
ordered cutpoints. 
DEFINITION  1: A strategy  T  is characterized by ordered  cutpoints if for every 
information service  k  there  are  cutpoints  (Xk)C  ..  M  with the  property that 
1>Xk  ...Xk  > -1  and  T(x,  k, v)  = 1 for  x <xk,  (x,  k, ov)  = 0 for  x>xk 
Observe that if a strategy is characterized by ordered cutpoints, then voters of 
type (x, k) with  x <xk  vote  for candidate  Q irrespective  of their private signal. 
Similarly, voter  types (x, k)  with  x >xk  vote  for  candidate  A  irrespective of 
their private signal. Voter types (x, k)  with x E (xk,  Xk)  change their vote 
depending on the signal they receive. We say such types take informative  action. 
PROPOSITION  1: Suppose Assumptions  1-6  hold.  Then there exists a  voting 
equilibrium -7*. Every voting equilibrium 
- * is characterized  by ordered cutpoints 
(4)  such that E(v(x1,  s) Ipiv,  o,,  k) = 0 for all (  , k).  Moreover, t(s, v  *) is 
nonincreasing  in s with 0 < t(s, v *) <  1 for all s. 
PROOF:  See Appendix. 
The  fact  that voting equilibrium can be  characterized by ordered cutpoints 
follows  from  the  fact  that  E(v(x,  s) Ipiv,  -,  o-, k)  is  strictly  increasing  in  x 
(Assumption 1) and nondecreasing in  o- (Assumption 4). The cutpoints allow us 
to simplify (2) to 
K  M 
(6)  t(s,'  *) =  ,  E  pk(Of  Is)F(x,,k). 
k=1  o=1 
The final part of Proposition 1 now follows since  Pk(  I  S')  first order stochasti- 
cally dominates Pk(  I S)  for s' > s and F(x4k,  k) is nonincreasing in  cr. 
4.  VOTING  EQUILIBRIA  IN  LARGE  ELECTIONS 
In this section we  analyze the limiting properties of a sequence  of elections 
with n voters, where n -*  oo.  Along any such sequence only the number of voters 
changes while the information structure, the payoffs, and all other parameters 
stay fixed. In the following we superscript our notation with  n to indicate that 
we are working with elements  of a sequence. We assume that for each element 
of the sequence  qn is an integer (Assumption 6). As before, this assumption is 
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4.1.  Large Elections and Informative  Action 
In this section we  show that informative action by the  electorate  creates  an 
incentive for individual voters not to vote informatively. This leads to the central 
result in this section: in a voting equilibrium with a large number of voters only 
a vanishing fraction of the electorate  takes informative action. 
We assume that the probability of receiving signal o- in state s is a continuous 
function of  s. 
ASSUMPTION 7:  Pk(o- I  s)  is continuous in s for all k and for all o-. 
Assumption  7 implies that for any symmetric strategy profile,  7T  t(s, 7T)  iS 
continuous. For the remainder of the paper we will assume that Assumption 7 
holds.  In  Example  2 we  demonstrate  how the  following  results  (in  particular 
Theorem  1) fail if Assumption 7 is violated. 
As we  argued above, voters must evaluate candidates in the  event  a vote  is 
pivotal. In the following we characterize the probability distribution over states 
conditional on the event that a vote  is pivotal. We define S  f7l  ) as the set of 
states for which the expected vote share of alternative Q is within 'q of the vote 
share of the state that minimizes  It(s, tf)  -  qI. More precisely, 
(7)  S7(  )q  =T  E[,]:I(,Tr  -  -ql  < min  It(s, 7T  -  -ql  +  qB 
If there is a state for which t(s, tf)  =  q, then  S  'q  7)  simply denotes  the set of 
states  for  which  the  expected  vote  share  of  alternative  Q  is  within  'q of  q. 
Lemma 1 demonstrates that for large n, conditional on a vote being pivotal, the 
probability distribution over states must be concentrated on those  states which 
generate  an expected vote share closest to  q. 
LEMMA  1: Suppose Assumptions  1-7  hold.  Consider a  sequence  of  strat- 
egy profiles,  (7n)  such  that  t(s,  f)  is  continuous,  nonincreasing and  0 < 
t  <  1. For any  q > 0, S  'q 
7T  is an interval of states with the property that 
(ln  1(s  I 
piDV  T -  n  1. 
PROOF:  See Appendix. 
To  get  an  intuition  for  Lemma  1 observe  that  the  number of  votes  for  Q 
follows a binomial distribution with parameter t(s,  tn),  where t(s, vfn)  is nonin- 
creasing in the state. If a vote is pivotal, then  qn voters out of a population of 
size n have voted for Q. Thus, if q E [t(1, en)  t(0,  f)]  and n is large, then the 
beliefs about the parameter t(s, 1f)  conditional on a vote being pivotal must be 
concentrated around q. This implies that the beliefs about the state conditional 
on a vote being pivotal must be concentrated around those states that produce a 
value  for  t(s,  f)  closest  to  q. If  there  is no  state  such that  t(s, t)=q  the 
beliefs  must be  concentrated  around those  states  where  t(s,)  -  q  is  mini- 
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Fix a symmetric strategy profile 7r. Consider a subset of states  S c [0,1] with 
the  property that  conditional  on  a vote  being  pivotal  the  state  is  in  S  with 
probability 1. If  Pk(0 I  s)  is constant  on  the  set  S  for  all signals  cr, then  the 
information service k  does not discriminate between  the states in S. Since the 
state is in S whenever a vote is pivotal, information service k is redundant.  Now 
consider a sequence of symmetric strategy profiles. We say service k is asymptot- 
ically redundant if it is redundant in the  limit. The  following definition makes 
(his prccisc. 
DEFINITION  2: Fix a sequence of symmetric  strategy  profiles  (ln)*  Informa- 
tion service k is asymptotically  redundant if for every E > 0 there is a sequence of 
sets  (Se),  with  S'  c [0, 1]  for  all  n,  such  that  fSn /3(s Ipiv, #-7T) ds -*  1  and 
IPk(Un  I  s)  -Pk(o"  I  s')I <  e  for any s, s' E S n and for all cr. 
In Lemma 2 we assume that the expected fraction of voters who receive their 
signal from service  k  and vote  informatively is bounded  away from zero.  We 
demonstrate  that  this  implies  that  information  service  k  is  asymptotically 
redundant. 
LEMMA  2:  Suppose Assumptions 1-7  hold.  Consider a sequence of symmetric 
strategy  profiles, 
- 
T',  that can be characterized  by ordered cutpoints with the prop- 
erty that for some k and some  8 > 0,  F(xk  n, k) -  F(xk, n  k) > 8 for all n.  Then 
k is asymptotically  redundant. In particular, there is a  constant c <  oo  such that 
Ipk(Or  I  s)-pk(Or  Is)I  <  T)c  for any  s, s' E S, (7r)  and  for all u. 
PROOF:  See Appendix. 
To  provide  an  intuition  for  Lemma  2,  first note  that,  by  Assumption  7, 
t(s I Trn)  is  continuous. Since 7T nis  characterized by ordered cutpoints, t(s I  7ln) 
is nonincreasing in s and 0 < t(s  I 77n)  <  1. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 1 to 
conclude that  fs,(Wn) f8(s  Ipiv,  Trn)  -*  1 for every rj  > 0. It is therefore  sufficient 
to show that there is a constant  c < oc such that  Ipk(ols)  -pk(r  Is')l < 7Wc  for 
any s, s' E STT0n)  and for all signals (r. 
Suppose there  are only two signals,  o-  = 1,2.  Now  consider  a pair of  states, 
s, s'  E S7,(Tn),  with s' > s. By the MLRP pk('  I  s) ?pk(1  I  s').  Recall that all the 
voters  with preference  types in the interval  (Xk'n, X4k,n)  choose Q if they receive 
signal 1 and A if they receive signal 2. By assumption F(Xk  n, k) -  F(xk  n, k) > 8, 
and thus, the  expected  fraction of voters who  choose  Q decreases  by at least 
86 (pk('  I  s) -pk(  I  s'))  between  s  and  s'.  Since  the  decrease  in the  expected 
vote share must be less than 2ij, it follows that pk(1  Is) -pk(  Is') must be less 
than 2-j/8  which establishes the Lemma. 
In  Lemma  3  we  consider  a  sequence  of  voting  equilibria  that  have  the 
property that  information  service  k  is  asymptotically redundant.  Under  this 
hypothesis we  show that  the  strategy of voters who  receive  their information 
from service k is almost independent of the signal they receive. More precisely, 
we show that X4'  xkn  -  0. 1038  T.  FEDDERSEN  AND  W.  PESENDORFER 
LEMMA 3:  Suppose  Assumption 1 holds. Consider  a sequence of voting equilibria 
T* n) and assume that information  service k is asymptotically  redundant. Then, the 
cutpoints corresponding  to  T  *  satisfy X  'n -  -0.>  o. 
PROOF:  See Appendix. 
To get an intuition for Lemma 3, observe that by the definition of asymptotic 
redundance,  we  find  a  sequence  of  subsets  of  states  with  the  property that 
Pr(s E S'  Ipiv,  -7i)  -> 1 and  that  the  signals from  service  k  discriminate very 
little  between  the  states  in  S'  if  E  is  small. Therefore,  the  expected  payoff 
difference between voting for Q and A,  conditional on a vote being pivotal, is 
almost independent  of  the  signal from service  k.  By Assumption  1, v(x, s)  is 
strictly increasing in  x  at a rate larger than  K.  As  a consequence,  there  is at 
most  a  small  interval of  preference  types  x  with  the  feature  that  the  voter 
prefers  alternative  Q  for  one  signal  and  alternative  A  for  another  signal. 
Therefore, the range of preference parameters for which a voter takes informa- 
tive action must be small if  E  is small, and the Lemma follows. 
Theorem  1 says that  the  expected  fraction  of  voters who  take  informative 
action in equilibrium must converge to zero. Furthermore, because every prefer- 
ence type is served by some information service (Assumption 3), the cutpoints of 
at least one information service must converge. 
THEOREM  1:  Suppose  Assumptions  (1)-(7)  hold.  Let  (7*f)  be  a  sequence  of 
voting equilibria, and let  (Xk4n)  be the corresponding  cutpoints. Then for  all k, 
F(X kn, k) -  F(Xk,n,  k) -0>  O and for some k, xkn  -_xk n ->  . 
The proof of Theorem  1 is straightforward. Suppose, contrary to Theorem  1, 
that the expected fraction of voters who receive their information from service k 
and take informative action is bounded away from zero. Then, Lemma 2 implies 
that k  is asymptotically redundant and so Lemma 3 implies that the cutpoints 
for  service  k  must  converge.  But  then  the  expected  fraction  of  voters  who 
receive their information from service k and take informative action converges 
to zero, establishing a contradiction. 
PROOF: By Proposition 1, in any voting equilibrium the cutpoints are ordered 
for all k, and hence, the first hypothesis of Lemma 3 is satisfied. Also note that 
F  does  not  have  any mass points.  Lemmas 2  and 3  imply that  in  any voting 
equilibrium  F(x( j,  k) -  F(xm n,  k) ->  0.  This  follows  since  by  Lemma  2,  if 
F(Xk, n, k) -  F(xk,  n k) stays bounded away from zero along some subsequence, 
then information service k  is asymptotically redundant. Lemma 3 then implies 
that  Xk,n'l  4n  -_ X0 which  in  turn  implies  that  F(Xk, n k)  - F(xk,  n k)  -O0, 
resulting in a contradiction. 
To prove the final part of Theorem  1 let  X*n  satisfy 
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Note that Xk,'  <X*f  <Xk4'  for all k. By Assumption  3 there is a k' such that 
f(x*n,  k ) ?  a/K.  We will show that x'  -k'nxk  n-  O. Suppose x4 'n-Xk  ,n2> 
> 0 for all n. Continuity of f(,  k')  then implies that  F(Xk" ,  k  ') -  F(xk',  n  k') 
2  iq > 0 for some  i  > 0 which yields the desired contradiction.  Q.E.D. 
4.2.  Voting  Behavior and Full Information  Equivalence 
In this section we show the following results: Theorem 2 demonstrates that in 
equilibrium large elections must be very close, i.e., the fraction of the electorate 
that  supports  alternative  Q  must  be  very  close  to  the  critical  fraction  q. 
Theorem 3 demonstrates that elections  effectively aggregate information. More 
precisely, we show that large elections almost always choose the alternative that 
would have been chosen if the state variable were common knowledge. In order 
to show these results, we require two preliminary lemmas. 
Lemma 4 provides the converse of Lemma 3. It says that if the cutpoints of an 
information service converge, then  the information service must be  asymptoti- 
cally redundant. 
LEMMA  4:  Suppose Assumptions  1-7  hold.  Consider a  sequence  of  voting 
equilibria  (r *n)  and the corresponding  cutpoints  (x/'  ).  If'  X'-  --*0  o for some 
k, then k is asymptotically  redundant. 
PROOF:  See Appendix. 
As  an  intuition,  observe  that  if  the  cutpoints  for  information  service  k 
converge to one  point, it must be  that the  expected  utility difference between 
the  alternatives, conditional on  a vote  being pivotal, changes very little  as the 
voter's signal changes. This can only be  the  case  if the  signal adds very little 
information once a voter conditions on being pivotal. Hence, information service 
k is redundant. 
The  following  results  use  the  strict  monotone  likelihood  ratio  property 
(SMLRP). The SMLRP implies that sampling many signals from  any informa- 
tion service makes it possible to determine the state with great accuracy. 
ASSUMPTION 8 (Strict Monotone  Likelihood Ratio Property): For all k, 
Pk(M  IS) 
Pk(1  Is) 
is strictly  increasing  in s and Pk( o- I  s)  satisfies MLRP. 
Assumption  8 implies  that  every information service  discriminates between 
any pair of states. This assumption excludes a situation (as in Example 3 below) 
in  which  some  preference  types  have  access  to  an  informative  information 
service that satisfies the  Strict Monotone  Likelihood Ratio  Property (SMLRP) 
while others do not. 1040  T.  FEDDERSEN  AND  W.  PESENDORFER 
Lemma 5 states that if the SMLRP holds, then in a large election voters can 
predict the  state  with  great  accuracy if  a vote  is pivotal. More  precisely, the 
distribution  over  states,  conditional  on  a  vote  being  pivotal,  converges  to  a 
distribution that is arbitrarily concentrated around some state s',  and s'  solves 
(8)  max Pr(piv I  s, 7*n ). 
sE  S 
LEMMA  5:  Consider a sequence of voting equilibria  (T *fn)  and suppose Assump- 
tions 1-8  hold. Then there is a unique state S' that solves maxS E  s  Pr(piv I  s,  *n). 
For every 8 > 0,  f{s :_Sni  ?a}l3(s Ipiv,*f)ds  > 1. 
PROOF:  See Appendix. 
To  get  an  intuition  for  Lemma  5,  recall  that  by  Lemma  4  at  least  one 
information service k  must be  asymptotically redundant. Thus, for every  E > 0 
we find a sequence  S  with the property that (1) fs  f3(s Ipiv  7T*)  ds -  1 and 
(2) the probability of receiving any signal from service k varies by less than  E on 
S'.  If Assumption 8 holds, then every information service discriminates between 
every  pair  of  states.  Therefore,  (2)  can  only  hold  if  the  maximum  distance 
between  any pair of  states  in  S'  is small. Hence,  the  probability distribution 
over states, conditional on a vote being pivotal, must be arbitrarily  concentrated 
around one state for n large enough. Since Sn maximizes the probability that a 
vote  is pivotal, it follows that  the  conditional  probability distribution must be 
concentrated around Sn. 
Theorem 2 says that in large elections  the expected vote share of alternative 
Q will be very close to  q. Let  XQ  denote the preference type who is indifferent 
between  Q and A  in state s = 1 and let  XA  denote  the preference  type who is 
indifferent between  A and Q in state s = 0. Then, by the assumption that voters 
never play weakly dominated strategies in a voting equilibrium, all preference 
types below  XQ always vote  for  Q, and all types above  XA  always vote  for A. 
Therefore, if 7*f  is a sequence of voting equilibria, then Fx(XA) ?  tn(s,  7T*n)  > 
Fx(xQ). 
THEOREM 2:  Suppose  Assumptions (1)-(8)  hold and suppose that Fx(xA) >  q > 
Fx(xQ).  Consider a  sequence of  symmetric voting equilibria (T*n).  Then for  all 
7q  > 0 there  is an n such that  for n >n,  Iq-t(s,  T*nfl  )I<  for all s. 
In a large election the actual vote shares are close to the expected vote shares 
with high probability. Theorem 2 therefore  implies that large elections  will be 
close with probability close to one in every state. Note that Theorem 2 holds for 
a wide variety of preference distributions. 
To  give an intuition for Theorem  2,  suppose  there  is a state  such that the 
expected vote share of Q is less than q -  -q  for all n. By Theorem 1 vote shares 
change very little as a function of s if the electorate is large. Therefore, for large 
enough  n,  the  vote  share of  Q  is less  than  q -  r/2  for  all  states.  Since  the ELECTIONS WITH  PRIVATE  INFORMATION  1041 
expected vote share of Q is decreasing in s (Proposition 1), it must be that s = 0 
minimizes the difference between  the expected vote  share and q. But then (by 
Lemma  5),  conditional  on  a  vote  being  pivotal,  the  state  is  close  to  0  with 
probability close to one. Since the fraction of voters who prefer Q in state s = 0 
is larger than  q  by assumption, the  expected vote  share of  Q  must be  larger 
than q. This establishes the desired contradiction. 
PROOF:  Suppose that  q 2  t(s, 7T*f)  + ?)  for some  s  and for all n  along some 
subsequence. From Equation 6 we get that 
t(O*n  )-t(l  ,  *n)  <  MaX  FX(Xk,n  )-  F(X 
k 
Since the right-hand side of the above inequality tends to zero, by Theorem 1 we 
can find an n' such that for n > n' 
tn(0,#1*n)  -  tn(1,  *n)  <  qr/2 
and hence q >  tn(S)  +  -j/2,  Vs. Since tn(S,  T*n)  is decreasing in s, it follows that 
Pr(piv I  S,  T*fn)  iS maximized at s = 0 and hence  Sn =  0. By Lemma 5 this implies 
that  for  every  E' >  0 
f 
(s  Ipiv,  - *n)  1. 
But  then,  for  every  E > 0 there  is  an  n'  such that  for  n > n'  all voters with 
preference parameters x > XQ  +  E must vote for A, and therefore Fx(xQ +  E) > 
t(s,  r*f)  for  all  E>  0.  Since  Fx(xQ) <q  we  obtain  a  contradiction  to  the 
hypothesis  that  t(s,  S*fn)  > q +  rq for  all  n.  (For  q<  tn(S)  -q  an  analogous 
contradiction can be obtained.)  Q.E.D. 
The probability with which large elections  choose  the  alternative that would 
have been  chosen  if  the  state  variable were  common  knowledge  serves  as  a 
natural benchmark for the performance of elections  as information aggregation 
mechanisms.'0 We say large elections  satisfy full infonnation equivalence if the 
alternative  that  wins  a  large  election  is  almost  certainly  the  same  as  the 
alternative that would have been  chosen  if the  electorate  were fully informed 
about the state variable. 
In order to formally define full information equivalence, let 
(9)  x*=Fil(q). 
If  q = 1/2,  then  x* is the expected preference parameter of the median voter. 
For  arbitrary q  we  call  the  voter  type  with  preference  parameter  x*  the 
'0Alternatively,  we could use as a benchmark  the situation  in which all the private  signals  are 
common  knowledge  among  voters.  Note, however,  that Assumption  8 and the law of large  numbers 
imply  that in a large  electorate  knowing  all signals  is almost  equivalent  to actually  knowing  the true 
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expected  q-median.  In  an  election  in  which  the  state  is  known,  the  actual 
q-median's preferred alternative wins. In a large election  the actual q-median's 
preference  parameter is very close  to  x* with probability close  to one. There- 
fore, full information equivalence is satisfied in a large election  if the expected 
q-median's preferred alternative wins with probability close to one. 
Clearly, the  alternative preferred by the  expected  q-median depends on the 
state. Let 
(10)  s* =  arg minlv(x*,  s)I. 
seS 
If  v(x*, s*) = 0, then  s  * is the  state  in which the  expected  q-median voter  is 
indifferent between  the two alternatives. If  v(x*, s*) > 0, then there is no state 
in which type x* prefers Q to  A,  and hence,  s  * = 0. Similarly, if  v(x*, s*) < 0, 
then  s* = 1. Informally, full  information equivalence  will be  satisfied if  Q  is 
almost certainly the winner when s < s* and A  almost certainly wins otherwise. 
We now formally define full information equivalence as follows: 
DEFINITION  3: We  say  that  a  sequence  of  strategy  profiles  satisfies  full 
information equivalence if for all  e > 0, there is an  n  such that for n' > n, the 
following holds: if  s < s* -  E  then  Q  is  elected  with probability greater than 
1 -  E; if s > s* +  E then  A is elected with probability greater than 1 -  E. 
We  now prove that full  information equivalence  holds for any sequence  of 
voting equilibria. 
THEOREM  3:  If Assumptions 1-8  hold, then every sequence of voting equilibria 
satisfies  full information  equivalence. 
To give an intuition, consider the case in which there is a state that makes the 
expected  q-median voter indifferent between the two alternatives, i.e., v(x*, s*) 
= 0. Lemma 5 implies that, conditional on a vote being pivotal, the distribution 
over states puts almost all the weight on the neighborhood of one state  Sn . Thus, 
voters  essentially  behave  as  if  state  S n  has  occurred.  First  we  show  that 
lim Sn  =  s*. To see  this, note that if, e.g., V(x*,  Sn)  >  E >  0,  then the fraction of 
voters who prefer Q in state  Sn  is smaller than and bounded away from q. But 
then, the fraction of voters who vote for  Q must be smaller than and bounded 
away from  q, which contradicts Theorem 2. From Lemma 5 we know that the 
election  is  tied  only  if  the  state  is very close  to  s*.  Since  the  vote  share  of 
alternative Q is strictly decreasing in s, this can only be the case if for s < s* -  E 
alternative Q wins with probability close to one, and for s > s* +  E alternative A 
wins with probability close to one. 
PROOF:  Case 1-If  Fx(xQ) > q, then since all voters with x < XQ will vote for 
Q,  alternative  Q will  be  chosen  with  probability close  to  one  for  large  n. ELECTIONS WITH  PRIVATE  INFORMATION  1043 
Moreover, this choice satisfies full information equivalence because voters with 
x <XQ  prefer alternative Q in every state s. A similar argument shows that the 
Theorem is satisfied if Fx(xA) < q. 
Case 2-Suppose  that  Fx(xQ) < q <FX(XA). Lemma 5 implies that there  is 
an s  n such that for all  8 >  0 and for all  E{1,..  ., M}, k E {1, ...,  K}, 
J  ,8(s  Ipiv,IT  a,  k)  >4 1. 
{s:  Is-s"  I <81 
We must show that  v(x*,  Sn)  ->  0. Suppose that along some subsequence 
V(X*,  Sn)  E >  0. 
Let  x < x*  be  such  that  v(x, 5n)  > 0  along  that  subsequence.  Then,  since 
,B(s  Ipiv, I  is arbitrarily  concentrated around Sn for large n, it follows that all 
voters with preference type x > (x* + x)/2  strictly prefer to vote for A. But this 
implies  that  t'(s)  < Fx((x*  +  X)/2)  <q  -  E'  for  some  E'  >  0  for  all  n  which 
contradicts Theorem 2. Thus, we have established that  v(x*,  Sn)  ->  0 and hence 
Sn 
It remains to be shown that for large n whenever s > s* +  E, the probability 
that  A  is  chosen  is  larger  than  1 -  E, and  whenever  s < s*  -  E, the  probability 
that A  is chosen is smaller than  E. Let w(m I  s, 7*n) denote the probability that 
m voters choose  alternative Q if the state is  s  and the strategy profile is  I*Tl 
Recall that Pr(piv ITs,*n)  is a single peaked function of s. Thus /8(s I  Tpiv,*n) 
can only be concentrated around s* if for s > s* +  E, 
Pr(piv  Is,  *n) 
Pr(piv Is*,17*n) 
Therefore, for every E >  0 there is an n' such that for n > n' 
W(qn ITs,  n)  Pr(piv  ITs,*n) 
w(qn Is*,  *  )  Pr(piv Is*,*n) 
Since  t(s,  *n)/t(s*,*n)  < 1 for  s >  s*  +  E, it follows  that  for  m > qn 
w(m  Is,  -f*n)  t(s,  *n)  . (1  -t(s  *n))n-m 
w(m  Is* ,T  )*n  t(s*,  I*n)  . (1 -t(S  *n))n-rn 
t(s,  -*n)qn.  (1  -  t(s, 
- 
*n))n-qn 
t(s*,  -J*n)qn.  (1  -  t(s*,  *n))n  -qn  <  E 
for n sufficiently large. And hence for all s > s* +  E, 
E  w(mIs,*n)<<E  E  w(mIs*,  *n)?<E. 
m>qn  m>qn 
This  implies  that  A  will  be  chosen  with  probability  larger  than  1 -  e.  An 
analogous argument shows that for s < s* -  E the probability that A is chosen is 
smaller  than  E.  Q.E.D. 1044  T.  FEDDERSEN  AND  W.  PESENDORFER 
5.  EXAMPLES 
For the following examples we assume that 
(11)  v(x,  s) =  -1  + 2x + 2s. 
Voter  preference  parameters are  distributed uniformly.11 Further, we  assume 
that for each information service k, there are two signals  o- E  {1, 21. 
5.1.  Strategic  Versus  Naive Voting 
Suppose that voters naively act as assumed in the literature on the Condorcet 
Jury Theorem:  each  voter  behaves  as  if  her  choice  alone  determines  the 
outcome.  Thus, a voter of type (x, k) with signal  o- votes  for  Q if  -1  + 2x + 
2E[s  I  o-, k] < 0 and for A  if  -1  + 2x + 2E[s  I  ,  k] > 0.  In this case,  a larger 
fraction of voters vote  informatively than in a voting equilibrium, and hence, 
more information is revealed by the vote  share. However, in contrast to voting 
equilibria, naive voting does not imply full information equivalence. 
Suppose g(s)  = 2s. Suppose, further, that there is one information service and 
p(2 I  s) = s and that q = 1/2.  A simple calculation shows that E[s I  v = 2] = 3/4 
and E[s I  v=  1] = 1/2,  and hence, under naive voting all preference types x > 0 
vote for A  independent  of their private signal. But this implies that in a large 
electorate,  A  will be  elected  with  probability close  to  one  for  all  s >  0. Full 
information equivalence requires that A be elected  only if s > 1/2.12 
5.2.  Example 2 
In this example we demonstrate how a failure of Assumption 7 (continuity of 
Pk(  I  s))  may lead to a voting equilibrium in which the fraction of voters who 
take informative action does not converge to zero, and hence, Theorems 1 and 2 
do not hold. However, voting equilibria still satisfy full information equivalence. 
Suppose that  g(s)  =  1, q =  1/2,  and there is one  information service that is 
described by 
11-or  if s>1/2, 
where  a < 1/2.  The  unique voting equilibrium is given by the  cutpoints  x1 = 
1/4  -  a/2  and  x2 =  -  1/4  + a/2.  The  equilibrium strategies  in this example 
are independent of  n. 
11 The model setup used in this example is nearly identical to the setup used in Lohmann (1993) 
with the key differences that we assume no costs to participate and uncertainty about the location of 
voter ideal points. As mentioned above, Lohmann does not analyze the asymptotic properties of her 
model. 
12 In Feddersen  and Pesendorfer  (1994) we show that for the  preferences  and the  information 
service given in this example, naive voting does not lead to full information equivalence whenever 
E(s)  # 1/2.  See  also  Austen-Smith  and  Banks  (1996)  and  Myerson  (1994)  for  a  discussion  of 
strategic voting and Jury theorems. ELECTIONS WITH  PRIVATE  INFORMATION  1045 
To see why the prescribed strategies are an equilibrium, note that It(s,  ITf)  - 
ql =  1(2 a -  1)2  for every s, and therefore, conditioning on the event that a vote 
is pivotal provides no information. As a consequence,  the signal is informative, 
conditional on a vote being pivotal, and private information remains valuable for 
all n. 
5.3.  Example 3 
We now give an example that demonstrates how Theorem 3 depends on the 
SMLRP. What  is critical in  this example  is  that voters with preference  types 
around  the  expected  q-median  voter  do  not  have  access  to  an  information 
service that discriminates between states as precisely as voters on the extremes. 
Suppose there are two information services, k E (1, 2}, and p 1(  I  s) = 1 -  s  and 
P2(0  I  S)  =  1/2,  i.e., information service 2 is not informative. Further, let q = 1/2. 
The  distribution  F  is  such  that  all  voters  with  preference  parameters  x e 
[-  1,  -.2]  U [.2,1] have access to information service 1 with probability 1, while 
all voters with preference  parameters x E [-  1/6,1/6]  have access to informa- 
tion service 2 with probability 1. 
We  assume  that  g(s)=  1  for  all  s.  Consider  the  cutpoints  x2  =  0  for  all 
(X= 1,2  and  x1 = 1/6,  x2 =-1/6.  Since all voters who receive  their informa- 
tion from service 1 have preference  types outside  the interval (-1/6,1/6),  no 
voter takes informative action in this strategy profile. 
To  see  that  this  is  an  equilibrium,  note  that  E(s  Ipiv, ir, 1,1) = 1/3  and 
E(s  Ipiv,  , 2,1) = 2/3.  Hence,  -1  + 2x + 2E(s  Ipiv,  , 1,1) < 0  for  x <  -1/6 
and  -1  +2x+2E(sIpiv,,2,1)>0  for x>  1/6. 
Therefore,  irrespective of  the  state,  each  alternative  has  a  50% chance  of 
winning the election  and full information equivalence is not satisfied. 
6.  UNCERTAINTY ABOUT  THE  DISTRIBUTION OF  VOTERS'  PREFERENCES 
Up  to  now we  have assumed  that voters  know the  distribution from which 
preferences  are  drawn. In  this  section,  we  show how  introducing uncertainty 
about  this distribution upsets  the  results. To  simplify the  analysis we  assume 
that voters  are uncertain  about  the  expected  fraction of  partisans, i.e., voters 
who choose either alternative Q or alternative A irrespective of the state. Let F 
be  a  probability distribution  that  satisfies  Assumption  3.  In  this  section  we 
assume  that  the  distribution  function  according  to  which  nature  selects  the 
electorate  depends on the parameter A E [0, 1] and is given by 
H,(x)  (i  -  4)F(x)  +  4(1  -A)  if-1  ?x<  1, 
1  if x=  1. 
Thus, HA has  4(1  -  A) mass at -1  and OA mass at  + 1. We assume that for all 
A E [0,1], 
(12)  HA(xQ) < q < HA(XA), 1046  T.  FEDDERSEN  AND  W.  PESENDORFER 
which implies that the  expected  fraction of voters who prefer one  alternative 
irrespective of  the  state  is always smaller than the  fraction necessary to  elect 
that alternative. 
In the first stage of the game, nature chooses both s and A independently. By 
l(A) we denote the density that describes the prior beliefs about the state A. We 
assume that there is an  a > 0 such that 1/a  >  l(A) > a  for all  A E [0,1]. After 
choosing the state (s, A), nature selects  an electorate  by taking n  independent 
draws from the distribution HA.13 
For the remainder of this section we assume that Assumptions 1, 2, 4-8  hold 
and that there is one information service described by p(cr I  s). It is straightfor- 
ward to  verify that,  in  this  modified  environment,  Proposition  1 still  holds.14 
Thus, there  exists  a voting  equilibrium, and  every voting  equilibrium can  be 
described by ordered cutpoints. 
Let 
(13)  x(A)  = HA  1  (q) 
denote  the expected  q-median voter if  A is realized. Further, let  s(A) be  such 
that  v(s(A), x(A)) =  0. Thus, s(A) is the  state  at which the expected  q-median 
voter is indifferent between  the two alternatives if  A is realized. Note  that (12) 
implies that s(A) is well-defined. Moreover, s(A) is a strictly decreasing function 
of  A. 
A  sequence  of voting  equilibria, therefore,  satisfies  full  information equiva- 
lence if for all  e >  0, there is an n such that if n' >  n then the following holds 
for every A:  if s < s(A) -  E, then Q is elected with probability greater than 1 -  e; 
if s >  s(A)  +  E, then  A  is elected with probability greater than 1 -  E. 
The first part of Theorem 4 says that the set of voters who use their private 
signal o- stays bounded away from zero in measure when the distribution of the 
electorate  is uncertain. The second part says that full information equivalence 
does  not  hold.  This  latter  result  will  be  shown  to  hold  for  a  typical utility 
function  v(x, s).  To make this precise,  denote  the  set  of  utility functions  that 
satisfy Assumption 1 by P. Endow P  with the topology of uniform convergence. 
We  say that  a property holds  for  a  generic  utility function  if it  holds  for  all 
v E 0  cP  where  0  is open and dense. 
The third part of the theorem says that if the uncertainty about the distribu- 
tion  of  preferences  is small, as compared to  the  uncertainty about  s  (if  0  is 
13 In Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1994) voters, in addition to the signal o-, also get a signal that 
provides noisy information about  A. All the  following results also hold in this case  and hence  we 
omit the second signal. 
14 Note  that if a voter learns her preference  parameter x  and if  x E  (-1,1)  she does not learn 
anything about the realization of  A since the likelihood of observing x E (-  1,1) is independent of  A. 
The  only  voters  who  get  information  about  the  realization  of  A by  observing their  preference 
parameter are voters with x E {  -  1, + 1}. However, these voters are partisans and will always vote for 
A (in the case of x = 1) or Q (in the case of  -1)  by Assumption 1. See Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) 
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small), then full information equivalence nearly holds. This should be seen as a 
continuity check. As the uncertainty about the distribution of preference  types 
becomes small, the information aggregation results of the previous section are a 
good  approximation of  a situation where  voters  are also  uncertain  about  the 
distribution of preference types. 
THEOREM  4:  Suppose k = 1,  Assumptions 1, 2, 4-8  hold,  and the preference 
types are drawn according to  the procedure described in  this section. Consider a 
sequence of voting equilibria  (fr*n).  Then: 
(i) there is an  j> O such that xn  -Xn  >  q for all n; 
(ii) there exists an 0  c P,  where 0  is open and dense, such that for every v  E 0 
the election does not satisfy  fuill information equivalence; 
(iii) For every e > 0  there is a 4'  >  0 and an n' such that if 4 <  4',  n >  n', then 
there are (so, s)  with the following properties: (1) if s < so, then Q is elected with 
probability  greater than 1 -  e;  if s >  sl,  then A  is elected with probability  greater 
than 1-e;  and (2) 1S0  -si?<  Eandso<s(A)<s,  for all A. 
PROOF:  See Appendix. 
To provide an intuition for the proof of part (i) of Theorem  4, suppose for 
(s, A) the expected vote share of alternative Q is q. Since the vote share for Q is 
a  strictly decreasing  function  of  A, if  the  vote  share  for  Q is  responsive  to 
changes  in  s,  we  can  decrease  s  and  simultaneously  increase  A so  that  the 
expected  vote  share  stays  unchanged.  Conditional  on  being  pivotal,  a  voter 
believes that one of the states has occurred for which the expected vote share of 
alternative Q is q. Thus, whether or not the vote share is responsive to changes 
in s, it is impossible to invert the map from states to vote counts. There is now a 
whole interval of states such that the expected vote share of alternative Q is q. 
Therefore, the beliefs over states, conditional on being pivotal, do not converge 
to a degenerate distribution. But then the private information of voters provides 
useful  information,  and  hence,  the  fraction  of  voters  who  take  informative 
action does not converge to zero. 
To  provide an intuition  for part (ii), note  that full  information equivalence 
requires that for states (s(A), A), the expected vote share of Q must be close to 
q for a large electorate,  since otherwise, close  to (s(A), A), the wrong candidate 
is chosen with high probability. This follows from the fact that the derivative of 
the expected vote share of  A with respect to s  is uniformly bounded above for 
all n. We show that for a generic choice  of  v, equilibrium strategies allow too 
few degrees of freedom to have the expected vote share equal to q for all states 
(s(A), A). 
Underlying Theorem 4 is the fact that there are two random variables, both of 
which are correlated with the votes for each alternative. This makes it impossi- 
ble for voters to invert back from votes to the payoff relevant state variable. As 
an alternative to the introduction of uncertainty about the distribution of voter 1048  T.  FEDDERSEN  AND  W.  PESENDORFER 
preferences, we could allow s  to be  a two-dimensional variable and get similar 
results.15 
7.  CONCLUSION 
Taken together,  our results demonstrate  the  importance of  the  information 
environment in determining the effectiveness  of elections  as information aggre- 
gation  mechanisms.  If  voters  are  uncertain  about  a  one-dimensional  state 
variable,  strategic  voting  results  in  effective  information  aggregation.  If,  for 
example, there is additional uncertainty about the distribution of preferences or 
if the payoff relevant uncertainty is of higher dimension, then electoral mecha- 
nisms do not perform so well. The importance of the  dimensionality of uncer- 
tainty for  the  performance  of  elections  suggests  that  future  research  should 
focus on the events that precede elections-nominating  procedures, campaigns, 
polls, etc.-as  such events determine the information environment. 
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APPENDIX 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION  1: First we demonstrate that any best response to a weakly undominated 
strategy can be characterized by ordered cutpoints. 
Note  that by Assumption  1 there is an  e > 0 such that  v(x, s) < 0  for all s  if  x E [-1,  -1  + e] 
and v(x, s) > 0 for all s if x E [1 -  E, 1]. Therefore, for any strategy 7r that is not weakly dominated, 
types with x E [-1,  -1  +  E] vote for Q irrespective of the signal and types with  x E [1 -  E, 1] vote 
for A  irrespective of their signal. This in turn implies for any strategy that is not weakly dominated 
Pr(piv I  s) > 0 for all s and hence  f3(s I  piv,  T,  o-, k) is well defined. 
By Assumption 1 v is strictly increasing and continuous in x. In addition v(-  1, s) < 0,  v(1, s) >  0 
for all s. Thus, it follows that there is a unique cutpoint  xk  E [-1,1]  such that 
(14)  E[v(x,  s) Ipiv,W,  r,k]  =0 
(the expectation is taken with respect to  /8(s Ipiv, ~T,  o,k)).  Clearly, 1 -  E>xk  >  -1  +  E. If x <xk, 
then a voter type (x, k) who receives signal  o- strictly prefers to vote  for Q, and if x > 4k, then a 
voter type (x, k) who receives signal  o- strictly prefers to vote for A. 
By the  MLRP,  it  follows  that  f8(s I  piv,  r, oa  ', k)  first order stochastically  dominates  18(s I  piv, 
T,  o-, k) whenever  o-' >  o-. Since v(x, s)  is increasing in s, it follows that 
E[ v(x,  s) Ipiv, 77r,  or  ', k] 2 E[ v(x,  s) Ipiv, 1-, ,-  k] 
and  xk >xk  . Thus, any best  response  to  a weakly undominated  strategy can be  characterized by 
ordered cutpoints. 
15  A result similar to the one given in Theorem 4 will hold as long as the two dimensions are not 
perfectly correlated, i.e., there does not exist a function a(s1, S2) such that v(x, s1, S2) = v'(x, a(sl, S2)) 
for some  v'. ELECTIONS WITH  PRIVATE  INFORMATION  1049 
Using  the  above characterization of best  responses we  now demonstrate  existence  of  a voting 
equilibrium. By the argument above, the cutpoints corresponding to any best response to a weakly 
undominated  strategy profile are in  the  interval [-1  + E, 1 -  E]. Thus,  to  demonstrate  existence, 
consider the following function: 
qfr:[-1  +  E,1-  E]KM  [-1  e  -E]KM. 
To  any  KM-tuple  a =  (all,...,alM,...,aKl  ....aKM),  let  fr(a) be  the  (unique)  set  of  cutpoints 
associated with the best  responses to the  strategy characterized by the  cutpoints (ak,).  Note  that 
substituting the cutpoints into Equation (6) we get 
K  M 
(15)  t(s,  a)  =  E,  E  Pk(0_IsMFak?,,k) 
k=1  a=1 
which is continuous in a since F  is continuous in x. Therefore,  13(s I  piv, a, o-, k) is continuous in a, 
and hence, continuity of  v implies  X  is continuous (a straightforward application of the Theorem of 
the  Maximum). Thus, by Kakutani's fixed point theorem, the map  Xf has a fixed point, and hence, 
the game has a voting equilibrium. 
The proof that t(s, i.*)  is nonincreasing in s  is in the text.  Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: By  assumption,  t(s, 7TT) is  nonincreasing  and  hence  S'(irn)  must  be  an 
interval  which  proves  the  first  part  of  the  lemma.  Also,  observe  that  since  0 < t(s, ifn)  < 1, 
,8(s  Ipiv,  7Fn)  is well  defined  for  all  n  and  all  s. 
Observe  that  if  S  (rn)  =  [0,  1]  then  JS,(w  n)  ,13(s  IpivIi,)  =  1,  and  hence,  if  we  prove  the  lemma 
for the sequence  of those  n for which S ,(if)  +  [0, 1] holds, then we are done. Thus, we assume in 
the following that the complement of  S  i(  fl)  is nonempty. 
For t E [It t2] 5 [0,  1] define 
L(t  = tq(l  _t)l  q 
and note that this is a concave, single peaked function which reaches a maximum at the t that solves 
minmt  [tl, t2I  -  ql- 
Let  t*n  =  arg  mintE[t(l,  1n)t(o,n)]  It -  qi.  Note  that  by  the  continuity  of  t(S,7Tn),  there  is  an 
s E [0, 1] such  that  t*n  =  t(s, in).  Since  for  s e  S )(17  ),  I  t(s,  sn)  _ t*nI  2  7j, single-peakedness  and 
continuity of  L implies that there is a  N  such that for all n 
L(t*n)-  sup  L(t(sIi7n))  2  ?  . 
We  define  the  set  of  states  P,O7n)  CS',(7-n)  by 
pj7(n)  =  {s: L(t(s  Iin))  2L(t*n)  -  /2} 
Since  t(s, sf)  is nonincreasing  and continuous,  it follows  that  P7,1n)  is  a nonempty interval. In 
addition, there is a y > 0 such that the length of  P,(77it)  is larger than y  for all n. To see this note 
that there is an  E  >  0 such that for all n 
max  t(s,  7n)  -  min  t(s,'  n)  >  E. 
P  (Wr  n)  p  (7 n) 
(This follows since maxp (Wn) L(t(s,  sn))  -  minp,(W  n)  L(t(s,  Wn))  = 8,,/2  and since  L  is continuous 
on  [0, 1].)  By  the  definition  of  t(s, sn)  (see  equation  (2)) 
-  t(s'Ii7T)I  ?  max  p&(`is)  -Pk(?  I  S')I- 
o,k 
The (uniform16) continuity of  Pk( o I  S) in s  implies that there is an y > 0 (independent  of  n) such 
16  Recall  that the  domain of  pk(r  I  s)  is compact  and hence  continuity of  Pk  implies uniform 
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that 
max IPk  (0-I  S)  -  Pk  (0  IS)  I <  'E 
cr,k 
whenever  Is -  s'l <  y. Therefore,  P,(7Fi ) is an interval of size at least  y. 
To prove the Lemma we now show that f, ;  S  (V,)  f3(s  Ipiv, 7rF)  --  0. 
(16)  fs  ,B  IiV  - n)  =  4 s,(Wn)  Pr(piv I  s)g(s)  fs  s,r'n)  Pr(piv  I  s)g(s)  ds 
s(1s6fo)  l(  Pr(piv Iw)g(w)dw  fs,  p,(7n)  Pr(piv Iw)g(w)dw 
<  (SUpS  rS(Wn)  Pr(piv I  s)  fI , s(n)  g(s)  ds 
inf e  p  ,n)  Pr(  piv Is)  pseP(Wn)  g(s) ds 
To  see  the  last  inequality,  note  that  g(s)  2 a > 0  implies  that  fs,Eg  p  'I(Wn) g(s)  ds 2 ay,  and using 
Equation (3), we get that, for s' e  S7(Rn) and for s  I 
Pr(pivls')  (L(t(s',  -r))  {  L(t*n)  68  \  '  (  1  - 
(17  =  <  < 
Pr(piv  I  s)  L(t(s,i  'n))  _  L(t*n) -  6/2  _  1-/2 
Since  8  > 0, inequality (16) implies that ft  s  (rn)  g(s)  ds converges to zero as n  oo,  thus proving 
the Lemma.  Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: By the assumption of ordered cutpoints it follows that 0 < t(s,  7Tn)  <  1 and 
that t(s,  -n)  is nonincreasing in s.  By Assumption 7 it follows that t(s, 1fn)  is continuous and hence 
the hypothesis of Lemma 1 is satisfied. Therefore, it suffices to demonstrate that there is a constant 
c < o  such that Ipk(uJ IsO) -Pk(-  I1S2)I <  W  for any  SI,  52 a S (ii n) with sI  < S2  and for all o-. 
Let  tk(s,n)  =  E  F(xk,  n,k)pk(o-  Is)  be  the  probability that  a  voter  receives  a  signal  from 
service k and votes for Q in state s. We first demonstrate that 
(18)  271  2  t(sl  :TTn)  _ 
n 
)  >t  T 
n 
)  7Tn). 
The first inequality in (18) follows from the definition of S  (W  n).  Note that F(xk  n, k) is nonincreas- 
ing  in  o-  by  the  assumption  of  ordered  cutpoints,  and  therefore,  by  the  MLRP,  tk(sl1,  n)- 
tk(s2,  1T)  2 0 for all k. Since 
t(lS  lt n)-(  ,  -n)  =  t(s,7n)  _  Ws,7n)), 
k 
the second inequality in (18) follows. 
Next we show that when  F(x'k n' k) -  F(Xk, n k) 2  S either 
(19)  tk(S1,  )  tk(S2,  I)  2  (pk(1  IS1)Ipk(0  IS2))8 
or 
(20)  tk(Sl  Wn)  tk(S2,  Tn) 2 (pk(MIS2)-Pk(MISl))8 
must hold. 
For any subset of signals 0  c  X, let Pr(O I  s) =  YoJ E o Pk((J  I s).  The probability that a voter votes 
for Q in state s  if he receives a signal in 0  from service k is 
(21)  E(F(xk  n) I  -EO,s)=  F(XkPn  k) pk(OI  s) ELECTIONS WITH  PRIVATE  INFORMATION  1051 
This probability is nonincreasing in s. To see this note that by the MLRP of Pk(S I  (J)  it follows that 
the  random variables  s  and  o- are affiliated (see  Milgrom and Weber (1982, Theorem  1)). Since 
F(Xk4', k) is a nonincreasing function of  or we can apply Theorem 5 of Milgrom and Weber (1982) 
to show that (21) is nonincreasing in s.  Thus E(F(xk4 n, k) I  0,  sl) 2 E(F(xk,  n'k)  I  0, s2). 
Let  0  = {2,...,  M -  1) denote  the  event  that  service  k  produces  a  signal  o-  such  that  2 < ar 
<M-  1; then 
tk(Sl  ,  T)  -tk(S2,I  7T ) 
=  (pk(  I  S1) -pk('  I  s2))F(xlk',n  k)  +  (pk(MI  S)  -pk(M  I  S2))F(XkMn, k) 
+ Pr(O I  sj)E(F(xk,',  k) I  0,  sl)  -  Pr(O I  s2)E(F(Xkn,  k) I  0  s2) 
Since E(F(xk  n, k) I  0,  s1) ? E(F(xk' n, k) I  0,  S2), it follows that 
tk(Sl ,I7Tn)  _  tk(S2,  I7T  ) 
2(  Pk(l  I  51)-Pk(1  I  S2))F(xlk,n,k) 
+ (pk(M  I  S1  -pk(M  I  S2))F(XM,  n  k) 
+ (Pr(O I  s1) -  Pr(O I  s2))E(F(xk,n,  k) I 0,  s1). 
Now  either  Pr(O I  s1) -  Pr(O I  s2) > 0  or  Pr(O I  sl)  -  Pr(O I  s2) < 0.  Note  that  by  construction 
F(Xk n,  k) 2 E(F(xk' n, k) I  0,  s) > F(xk, n, k) for any s. Suppose Pr(O I  s  )  -  Pr(O I  S2)  > 0. Then 
tk(Sl,  I  n) -  tk(S2  Tn) 
2(Pk(l I  sl)-Pk(  I  s2))F(xlk,n,k) 
+(pk(MIs 51-pk(M1  s2))F(xkMn, k) + (Pr(O I  sl)  -  Pr(O I  s2))F(xknS,k). 
Since, by definition, Pr(O I  s) = 1 -pk(1  I  s) - pk(M  I  s),  we  can simplify the  right-hand side  of  the 
last inequality to obtain (19) as follows: 
t(lS  Xi-n)-t7(T-,  n) 2  kl|S)Pk(  I  S2))(F(xlk  n, k) -F(Xk,n,  k)) 
2  (Pk('  SI)  51-Pk('  I  S2))'6- 
On the other hand, if Pr(O I  s1) -  Pr(O I  s2) < 0, then 
tk(S,  in)  -  tk(S2,  iT ) 
2(Pk('  I SO -Pk(  I  S2))F(xlk,n 
+(Ppk(MIS)  5-pk(MI  s2))F(xfk,n,k)  + (Pr(O Isl)  -  Pr(O I  s2))F(xk,n',k), 
which can again be simplified to yield (20) as follows: 
tk(Sll  F  tn) -t(S2,  TFn)  2 ( Pk(M  I  S2)-_Pk(M  I  Sl  ))(F(Xlk,n, k) -F(xk,n,  k)) 
2 ( Pk(M  I  S2) -Pk(M I  SM))8 
We complete the proof by showing that (18) and (19) imply there exists a constant c <  oo  such that 
(22)  ?)C  2I Pk( UI  I  SO  )-Pk(0  Is2)1 
for all cr. The argument for the case where (18) and (20) holds is entirely analogous and is therefore 
omitted. 
If  (18)  and  (19)  hold,  then  27q/8  Pk(1  I  S1) -  Pk(  I  S2).  Now  the  MLRP  implies 
Pk(  I  S1)  Pk(aI  SI) 
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Recall that Pk((o I  S) 2 a  by Assumption 5, and therefore, 
a + 2rq/8  Pk(1I s) 
a  Pk('  Is2) 
Thus,  it  must  be  the  case  that  Pk((JIS)  -Pk((J  1S2) <  2rj/(8a)  for  all  o-.  The  equality 
M=  1 Pk(U  I  SI)  =  EM  1I  Pk(o  I  S2)  then  implies  that  Pk(  I  S2) -Pk(  I  SI)  <  2N  (M-  1)/(8a). 
Therefore I  pk(uI I  SI)-Pk(uI  I  S2)1 < 2q -(M-1)/(Sa)  for any  o-.  Q.E.D. 
PROOF  OF  LEMMA  3: Let  S'  c  [0,1]  be such that Pr{s E S'  Ipiv, 1T*n`} -  1 and 
(23)  [Pk(  Is)-Pk(-  IS')I  < E 
for any s, s'  E S'  and for all  o-. Thus, we can choose  n' such that for n > n' 
(24)  fs  v(x, s),8(s Ipiv,  1T*n,  o-,  k) ds  <  E max  Iv(x, s)I. 
S  SE  S,,x 
By (23) for any s E S'j we can write Pk(oJ I  S) =  a,  +  ?  (s) where  a < a, < 1 and I  e(s)I < E. Note  that 
v(1, 1) > 0, v( -  1, 0) < 0, and v(1, 1) 2 v(x, s) 2 v( -  1, 0) by Assumption 1. Thus it follows that 
(25)  E[ v(x,  s)  Ipv7T*n  M, k, SE  - E[ v(x,  s)  IpvT*n  1, k, SE] 
l  B(s  Ipiv,7*n)(a,  +  E) 
< V  (1  , 1  1,  t,  ( W I  piV,  7T  *n)(  -  )d  s 
fS 
(w  Ipiv,7T  )(a, 
-  E)  dw 
,B(s  Ipiv,7Tn)(am  -  E) 
,8 (W  I piV,  - *n  d 
fS n3(w  Ipiv,  *n)(am  +  E)  dw 
/3(S  Ipiv,I*n)(aM  ?  E) 
J  fwITiv*)(a,M-  E)d)d 
Sn  83(  W  l  piV,  -  *n)(  -)d  d 
=v(1,1)( 
-  __  M-E  )?f 
nIT  )(a  1  _  dw 
a1?E  aME(  I  iV  ?1~-,  -  *n1E 
al  -  e  aM  +  IT  )am  +  c)  ds- 
V1  )a,+1-E  amf?e  J 
V_J  a,-,E  amE  JI 
where ol(E)  can be made arbitrarily  small for small  E. Inequality (24), together with (25), then imply 
that 
(26)  E[v(x,  s)  lpiv, M,k]  -  E[v(x,  s)  lpiv, 1, k]  <  2E max lv(x,s)l  + o1(E) 
s, x 
=  0(E). 
Recall that for all  u,  E[v(xkn, s)  IpiV, T*n, o-, k]=O.  By Assumption 1, for x 2x',  v(x, s)-v(x',  s) 
2  K(X  -  X')  for some  K > 0 and therefore 
(27)  0 = E[ v(xlk  , s) Ipiv, M, k] -E[  v(xm  , s) Ipiv, 1, k] 2  K(Xi  nXM  )o(c). 
Thus it follows that 
xkn  - xkn  <  O(C)IK  w1  m 
which proves the Lemma since  E can be chosen arbitrarily  close to zero.  Q.E.D. ELECTIONS WITH  PRIVATE  INFORMATION  1053 
PROOF  OF  LEMMA  4:  By Proposition 1, we have that 
E(v(s,  Xk4') Ipiv, 7T*n,  o-, k) = E(v(s,  xkl'n)  Ipiv,  iT*n,  o ', k) = 0. 
Since x  xkn  -XO'  0, it follows from the continuity of  v(x, s) in x  that for any x E [x  O'  , 4,n], 
E(v(s,  x)  Ipiv, iT*n, o- ', k) -E(v(s,  x)  Ipiv, ~T*n,  o-, k)  O-, . 
Note  that  v(x, s)  is  strictly increasing  in  s  with  Iv(X,  S) -  V(X, S')I ?  KIS  -  S'i  for  some  K>  0  by 
Assumption  1. Thus 
E(v(s,  x) Ipiv, ~T*n,  M, k) -E(v(x,  s) Ipiv, ~T*n,  1, k) 
K  (E(s  Ipiv,  T*n, Mz, k) -E(s  Ipiv,  -*n,  1  ) 
and hence  it is sufficient to show that E(s Ipiv,  *n,  M, k) -  E(s  Ipiv,  "*n,  1, k) > 8  for some  8 > 0 
whenever asymptotic redundance is violated. 
Suppose  asymptotic redundance is violated  for some  k. Then,  along some  subsequence,  there 
must exist a  8 > 0 and  E > 0 and a sequence  snj, sn,  such that 
Pr([0,sn]Ipiv,7T*n)>8,  Pr([sn,1]Ipiv,iT*n)>8  Vn  and 
IPk(  I  s)  -Pk(ois')i  >  E 
for some  sn ?  s < s'  < sn  and some  o-. This must hold  since  otherwise  for every  E > 0  and every 
8 > 0 there exists a sequence of intervals In such that Pr(In Ipiv,  T*fn) 2  1 -  28  for sufficiently large 
n,  and  Ipk(ns)-pk(oJIs')j?E  for  all  s,s'  I  and  every  signal  o-  which  implies  asymptotic 
redundance. It follows from the continuity of  pk(o- I  s)  that we can choose  E such that s n  - sn  >  E. 
Now  let  Sn =  [0, sln],  Sn=  (s n, sn),  and  S  =  [sn,  1]. By  the  MLRP,  E(s  I  S n, piv,  *n,M, k) > 
E(s I S,piv,  7T*n,  1, k) for i=  1, 2, 3, and therefore, 
(28)  E(s  I  piv, 7T  *n,  M  k) -E(s  I  piv,  * n, 1, k) 
3 
2  ?  [Pr(SW  Ipiv, ~T*n,  Mt, k) -Pr(Sin  Ipiv, 7T*n,  1, k)]E(s  I  S'n,  piv, 1T*n,  M, k). 
i=l1 
Suppose  Pk(  _  I  S')  -  Pk(  - I  S) >  E  for  some  S,  ?S  < s'  < sn  (an  analogous  argument  can  be  made 
for  pk(JI  S) -pk(I  S') <  -E)  and  some  signal  o-.  Recall  that  by  Assumption  5,  pk(-I  s) ?  a 
for  all (a,  s).  The  MLRP then  implies that  pk(M I  S') - pk(M  I  s) 2 ca.  Since  pk(M I  s)  is nonde- 
creasing in  s,  and pk(1  s)  is nonincreasing in  s  this in turn implies that for any  a  S{,  s3 E Sn 
Pk(M  S1) -pk(M  Is3)  >  Ea and  Pk(1 IS1)  -pk(  IS3) <?.  Since  Pr(S,"  lpiv, I*)>  for  i =  1, 3, we 
may  conclude  that  there  is  a  y > 0  such  that  Pr(S{'  Ipiv,  7*f,  1, k) -Pr(S{'  Ipiv,  v", M, k)>  y 
and  Pr(S3  I3piv,  T*fl  M, k)  -  Pr(S3 lpiv,  n  1, k)  >  y.  But  then  (28)  and  the  fact  that 
E(s  I  S ', piv,  * n, M, k) is increasing in i with E(s  I  S n, piv,  T*f,  M, k) -  E(s  I  Sjn,  piv,  *fn  M, k) > E 
imply that 
E(s  Ipiv, 1 *n, M, k) -E(s  Ipiv, lT*n,  1, k) 2  yE, 
which completes the proof.  Q.E.D. 
PROOF OF LEMMA 5:  By  Proposition  1, we  have  that  0 < t(s,  *n)  <  1, and  hence 
f3(s  IpiV,  *n,  o-, k) 
is well defined. 
First we show that t(s, 1T*n)  is strictly decreasing in s. To see this, let (xk' n) denote the cutpoints 
corresponding to  .*fl  Also, let  x"  be defined by 
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Since the signal satisfies the SMLRP it follows that 
(29)  E[v(x,  s) Ipiv, 7*n,  1, k] <E[v(x,  s) Ipiv, 7T*'1  <  E[v(x,  s)  Ipv,*n  M, k]. 
This implies that  xk,n  >  ,  >Xk'n.  Since x?n is in the support of F(,  k) for at least one  k, it follows 
that  F(xkn, k) -  F(xkn,  k)>  0  for  some  k.  Since  Pk(0 Is)  satisfies  the  SMLRP  it  follows  that 
Pk(_  I  s)  iS ordered  by strict first order stochastic  dominance.  Hence  t(s, v*n) =  S  ,  F(x  n, k) 
Xpk(r  o-  s)  is  strictly  decreasing  in  s. 
As  a consequence,  Pr(piv I  s,  T*f)  is strictly increasing if  t(s,  iT*n)  > q  and strictly decreasing if 
this  inequality  is  reversed. Continuity and  monotonicity  of  t(s, 7r*n) then  imply that  there  is  a 
unique sn that solves 




and the first part of the Lemma follows. 
By  the  preceding  argument  and  the  fact  that  t(s,  * n)  is  decreasing  in  s,  it  follows  that 
Pr(piv  I  s,7r*n)  is  monotonically  decreasing  for  s <Sn  and  for  s ?Sn.  This  implies  that  for  any 
8<  1/2  either  (i)  s'  -  8  0  and  sup{s,[o,l]  ssnI>  S  Pr(piv  Is5Ji  *n)  =  Pr( piv ISn  _-  5,*n)  or  (ii) 
S'  + 8 < 1 and  sup{s E [o l1s:Isnl > 8,  Pr(piv I  s',  T*n)  =  Pr(piv I  Sn +  8 ,Ti*n).  Suppose  that (i)  holds. 
(Case (ii) is entirely analogous with the interval [Sn, Sn + 8] replacing [sn -  8, Sn].) Then 
sup{  -  snl> 81 Pr(piv I  s,  *n) 
inf[n  ,Sn] Pr(piv  I  s,  *n)  ? 
and since g(s)  > a > 0 it follows that 
{s30s-s)l<8}  'p*n)  ds  lf{s:Is-snI  ?o  Pr(piv  Is,  ,  7r  *n)g(s)  ds 
(30) 
p(Sn  i  *n)ds 
}fPr(piv  IP  i  s,  *n*)g(s)  ds 
1  ? Jss_Snj>  <}  Pr(piv I  s,  T*n)g(s) ds 
f{s:ls-snIl  >  5  Pr(piv  Is,  5T*n)g(s)  ds 
1  ?  Sl  .  Pr(piv IlS,  i*n )g(s)  ds 
f[Sn_  8,Sn] Pr(piv I  s, if*n)g(S)  ds 
>  1>0. 
1+- 
8a 
To  show  that  in  fact  J{S:I  ssnl  <  }  ,B(s  Ipiv, j*n)  ds  -*  1, we  first  claim  that  for  any  E >  0 we  can  find  a 
sequence  of  sets  In  with  supIn  -  inf In  <  E  such  that  Pr{s E InIpiv,7T*n}  -*  1.  Assume  for  the 
moment this claim is true. Then, by (30) it must either be the case that sn E In or that infjn  Is -  sni 
0 since otherwise Pr{s  In I  piv, 7T*n}  stays bounded away from zero. As a consequence, for every 
8  >  0 there is a  E >  0 and an n' such that for n > n',  In c  {s:  Is - snI <  8}  and the Lemma follows. 
To complete the proof of the Lemma it therefore suffices to show that we can find a sequence of 
sets  with  Pr{s E  I n  Ipiv,  7T* n}  ..  1  and  sup I n -  inf In  <E.  Assumption  8  implies  that  pk(  Is)  is 
strictly  stochastically  dominated  by Pk(  I s')  for  s'  >  s (see  Witt  (1980)).  As  a consequence,  Pk(1  I  s)  iS 
strictly decreasing on [0, 1]. This, together with continuity of  Pk('  I  s),  implies that for every E >  0 
there  is a  E'  >  0 such  that  IPk(1 I  s)  -pk('  I  s)l>  E'  whenever  Is -  sil  >  E. By Theorem  1 there  is  an 
information  service  k  for  which  x4k'n  -  -*  0.  Now,  Lemma  4  implies  that  this  informa- 
tion  service  is  asymptotically redundant,  i.e.,  there  is  a  sequence  of  subsets  of  states  Sn,I with 
Pr{s  a  S  e  Ipiv,  1  T  "}  1. In  addition,  for  any  s, s'  E  Sn,  we  have  that  Ipk(a  I  S) -Pk(S  I  s')i  <  E,  for ELECTIONS WITH  PRIVATE  INFORMATION  1055 
all  cr. Thus it follows that sup Sn, -  inf S,  <K  E. Hence  choosing  In = Sen'  completes the proof of the 
Lemma.  Q.ED. 
PROOF  OF  THEOREM  4-Part  (i):  Suppose that contrary to the Theorem, x4 -  XM -'  0. Therefore, 
Ixa 
-  X,  1  0 for all  a-, a- '. Note  that Lemma 4 can be applied to this modified framework without 
changing the proof and hence we conclude that the information service is asymptotically redundant. 
The  SMLRP implies  that  p(l  Is)  is  strictly decreasing  on  [0,1].  This, together  with  continuity of 
p(l  Is),  implies  that  for  every  E>  0  there  is  a  E' >0  such  that  Ip(l  Is) -p(l  s')>  E'  whenever 
Is -  s'l>  E. By  asymptotic redundance,  there  is  a  sequence  of  subsets  of  states  S',  with  Pr{s E 
S', Ipiv,7'*}  1. In addition, for  any s,  S'ES',  we  have that  Ip(oIls)-p(ols')I<E'  for all  a. 
Thus it follows that sup S', -  inf S', <,E, and hence, the probability distribution over states  s E [0,1] 
must converge to a probability distribution that has all its mass concentrated at some  Sn. 
First we show that  E < sn < 1 -  E for some  E >  0. To see this suppose, for example, sn -  0. For 
large n, (12) implies that the fraction of voters who prefer Q at s = 0 is larger than q + 71,  for some 
-1  > 0. Therefore, the vote share of q must be larger than q +  -q/2 for large n for all A and all s. But 
this  in  turn implies  that  s = 1 is  the  state  for which voters  are most  likely to  be  pivotal, which 
contradicts  Sn  -O 0. 
Given the equilibrium cutpoints xn, let 
(31)  t(s,  A,  ii*n)  =  (1  -  4) Ep(  Is)F(xn  ) +  4(1  -  A), 
(32)  Pr(piv  I  s,  A,  *n)=  ( n  t(s,  k, 7r*n)qn _  (1-t(s,  AST*n))nqn  p  IT ~~~qn, 
and 
Pr( piv ls,j*n)  =  f'Pr(piv  I  s,  A,  ii*n)l(A)  dA. 
0 
Since  E < s*n  <  1 -  E, the  relative  likelihood  of  being  pivotal  in  state  s  n and  states  s =  0, 1 must  be 
small. More precisely, it must be the case that 
Pr(piv I  0,  *n)  Pr(piv I 1,  *n) 
Pr(pivIs  *n, 7*n) 
> 
Pr(piv  Is*n  n  )  0*n) 
Let  An(s)=argmin  It(s,  'A,7*n)_qI  and  note  that  t(s, A,*n)q(l  (,  ,T*n))lq  is  a  single 
peaked  function  that  reaches  its  unique  maximum  at  t(s,  An(s), ii  *n). 
Suppose  An(s*n)  2  e >  0 for  all  n.  We  will  show  that  in  this  case 
Pr(piv  I  O,  07  *n  ) 
Pr(piv  I  s*n, 
- 
*n) 
stays  bounded  away  from  zero  and  therefore  contradicts  (33).  First,  define  bn = t(0,  A, 7Fl*n)- 
t(s*fn, A, IT*n) > 0  and  hence  t(0, A,  *n)  =  t(s*fn, A +  (bn/p),i  *n).  Note  that  bn is  independent  of 
A and that bn -O 0 (this follows since X n-4  -X 0). 
Pr(piv I  )  f 1 t(O,A, 7r*n)qn.  (l -t(O,  A,  7T*n))n  -qn l(A) dA 
Pr(piVl  I *)  f I t(s*n,  A, -*n)qn. (1 _ t(S*n, A,  7*n))n- qn  l(A) dA 
fb"/4,p t(s*n,  A, f.*nl)qn.  (1  _ t(S*nl,  A,  i*n))n-qn  (A) dA 
e  nin 
>  1l t(s*n  A,  *n)qn.  (1  _t(S*n  77  A*  n))  qIAd 
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If  A(s*n) -*  0  then  it  follows  that  A(s*n) stays bounded  away from  1,  and we  can  make  an 
analogous argument showing that 
Pr(piv  I 1,  *n) 
PrMpiv  I  s*  n,*n) 
stays bounded away from zero. 
Thus we have again a contradiction to (33), and therefore, we demonstrated that it cannot be the 
case that x1 -x  -  0, which completes the proof of part (i). 
Part (ii): Since p(o- Is) is continuous  in s, it follows that  t(s, A,  7*nl)  is uniformly continuous  in 
(s, A), and therefore, full information equivalence requires that 
lim It(s(A),  A, 7T*n)  -  ql =  0 
n  x 
for all A. To prove part (ii) we will demonstrate that for a generic utility function there is a A E (0, 1) 
and  an  E >  0  such  that  It(s(A), A, '*f)  -  ql >  E. 
Let  -  = {B E [0, 1]M:  B, < B2 <  < BM  and  Bl < BM} and observe that 
M 
(34)  t(  *)(-  #p(or  Is)B,  + o(l-  A)  TB(s,  A) 
tr  1 
for some vector B E.-P. For each  B e.W we define 
(35)  ;(B,  A) =  arg min [TB  (s, A) -q] 
s 
Note  that  g(B, A) is a continuous  function  since  (35) has a unique  solution.  (Recall  that p(o- Is) 
satisfies the SMLRP.) 
Let  P'  denote  the  set  of strictly decreasing continuous  functions  s: [0, 1] -*  (0, 1) and endow it 
with the topology of uniform convergence. We will show that there is an open and dense set O' c P' 
such that for every s E O'  there is an r1> 0 such that 
max IS(A)  -  (B,  A)l  >  7 
A 
for all B E [0, 1]M.  Suppose for the moment that this claim is true. Since x(A) is a continuous  and 
strictly increasing function it follows that for any s E P'  there is a v(x, s) that satisfies Assumption 1 
and the equation v(s(A), x(A))  =  0 for all A. If v(s(A), x(A)) = 0 for all A, we will say in the following 
that s is generated by v. Let 0  =  {v E P:  v(s(A), x(A)) = 0 , for some  s E 0'}.  Since O' is open, 0  is 
also an open set. It remains to be shown that 0  is dense. To this end suppose that s is generated by 
v. If s'  satisfies  Ils'  -  sil <  E, then we can define  v'(s, x)  v(s + s(A) -  s(A),  x)  for all  s E [s(A) - 
s'(A),  1 -  s(A)  -  s(A)].  For  E  small  enough  s'(A)  E [s(A)  -  s(A),  1 -  s(A)  -  s'(A)]  and  hence  any 
extension  of  v'  to  all of  [0,1] x [-  1,1] generates  s'(A). Note  that for s E [s(A) -  s'(A), 1 -  s(A) - 
s(A)]  we  have  that  Iv'(s, x) -  v(s, x)I < maxE < S  <1  (v(s, x) -  v(s -  E, x)).  Therefore,  we  can  ex- 
tend  v'  to  all of  [0,1] x [-1,1]  such that  IIv  -  v'lI <  maxE  < s < 1 x (v(s, x) -  v(s - E, x)).  Since  v  is 
(uniformly) continuous, it follows that for every 8 > 0 there is an  E >  0 such that if Its'  -  sIt  <  E, then 
we can find a v'  that generates  s' with the property that  lIv' -  vll <  8, and hence,  0  is dense in P. 
To prove the claim, consider points (A1,...,  AM+  )  and let 0 < A1  < A2  <  *- <  AM++, < 1, and let 
S =  {(sl,...,  SM+ 1):  si = ;(B,  Ai) for all i = 1.  M + 1 and some B ES=8'}. 
Since  ;  is a continuous function of B, it follows that S is contained in an M-dimensional manifold. 
Let S be the closure of S and note that S is also contained in an M-dimensional manifold. Consider 
the set of functions s that satisfy (s(Al ), . . ., s(AM+  I)) O S. Let O' denote this set and note that O' is 
open since S is a closed set. To see that O' is dense suppose that s X  O'. The set 
T=  {(s,,...,  SM+1):Si  =  s'(Ai)  for all i=  1.  M+  1 and some s' with Ils' -  sil <  E} ELECTIONS WITH  PRIVATE  INFORMATION  1057 
is an open subset of RM? 1. Since S is contained in an M-dimensional manifold, T\S  is nonempty, 
and  hence,  there  exists  an  s'  with  ls -  s'jl <  E  and (s'(A1),...,s'(AM+  1)) e S.  Therefore,  s' E O' 
which proves that O'  is dense. 
Part (iii): Let  s* be as in Theorem 3 (i.e., corresponding to  4 = 0) and suppose that part (iii) of 
the  Theorem  does  not  hold. Then  there  must exist an  E >  0  and a sequence  (n, on)  with  n -x oo, 
-  0  and (i) for  s < s* -  E  alternative  A  is  elected  with probability greater  than  E  or (ii) for 
s > s* +  E alternative Q is elected with probability greater than  E for all n. 
We will derive a contradiction. The proof repeats arguments given above and is therefore  only 
sketched. First, we can use the  same argument as in the proof of Theorem  1 to demonstrate that 
Ixn,4n-x4-I  -*0.  (As  before  we  can  show  that  if  Ix n,--xn4nI>  v>0  for  all  n,  then  the 
information  service  is  asymptotically redundant.  The  argument  is  a  slight  modification  of  the 
argument  given  in  Lemma  2,  and,  therefore,  omitted.  Lemma  3  demonstrates  that  asymptotic 
redundance  of  an  information  service  implies  that  the  cutpoints  converge.  This  Lemma  can  be 
applied without modification, and hence, we demonstrated that cutpoints converge.) As in the proof 
of  part (i), cutpoint convergence  implies that the beliefs  conditional  on  a vote  being pivotal must 
converge  to  a  point  mass.  I.e.,  there  is  a  sequence  of  states  sn  such  that  for  every  8 > 0, 
Pr(Is -  sSnl>  8 Ipiv,  l)->  1. But then,  by the  same  argument as in  the  proof of  Theorem  2, the 
probability that  any  given  voter  votes  for  Q  must  converge  to  q.  Repeating  the  argument  of 
Theorem  3, this implies that  sn -* s*  and that we can choose  8 > 0 such that for s < s* -  E, Q is 
elected  with  probability larger  than  1 -  E  whereas  for  s >s  -  E,  A  is  elected  with  probability 
greater than 1 -  E which contradicts our initial hypothesis.  Q.E.D. 
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